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INTRODUCTION
This short paper introduces the reader to the mutating 
military concept of hybrid warfare and one of its implementing 
methods, the use of law as a weapon. We aim to provide a 
current, comprehensive definition of the terms “hybrid 
warfare” and “lawfare”. This submission focuses on the 
following areas: where law has been/is being used as a method 
of war, namely the Jus ad bellum, the jus in bello and the law of 
treaties in international relations. 
HYBRID WARFARE
Hybrid warfare as a warfare concept is not new among 
those practising the art of war. However, contemporary events 
lead us to argue that today’s hybrid warfare “has the potential 
to transform the strategic calculations of potential belligerents 
[it has become] increasingly sophisticated and deadly” (A 
Deep, ‘Hybrid War: Old Concept, New Techniques’, Small Wars 
Journal, March 2, 2015). 
The concept of hybrid warfare has been discussed by (mostly 
US) military writers since the beginning of the 21st century 
and its recognition as a theory in formal military doctrinal 
thinking is still not settled. Hybrid warfare may use elements 
from four existing methods and categories of full spectrum 
warfare, namely:
• conventional warfare; 
• irregular warfare (such as terrorism and counter-
insurgency); 
• related asymmetric warfare (unconventional warfare 
such partisan warfare); and• compound warfare 
(where irregular forces are used simultaneously against 
an opponent while being employed by state actors to 
augment their otherwise conventional warfare approach). 
Hybrid warfare builds on existing doctrinal elements and 
adds the following: 
a) evolving war-fighting capacities in the fifth dimension 
such as “cyber-warfare”; and
b) activities in the so called information sphere (Sascha Dov 
Bachmann and Hakan Gunneriusson, “Russia’s Hybrid 
Warfare in the East: The Integral Nature of the Information 
Sphere,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs: 
International Engagement on Cyber V (2015): 199-200).
The hybrid warfare concept recognises the existing and 
documented notion of hybrid threats as identified by NATO 
(cf NATO’s Bi-Strategic Command Capstone Concept, 5000 
FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040, dated August 25, 2010: 
BI-SC Input for a new Capstone Concept for The Military 
Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats (MCCHT)). 
NATO’s Bi-Strategic Command Capstone Concept describes 
these hybrid threats as “those posed by adversaries, with 
the ability to simultaneously employ conventional and non-
conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives”: 
(Hybrid Threats Description 1500/CPPCAM/FCR/10-270038 
AND 5000 FXX/0100/TT-0651/SER: NU0040 dated August 
25, 2010; BI-SC Input for a new Capstone Concept for the 
Military Contribution to Countering Hybrid Threats (para 
7) cited in S Bachmann, “Hybrid Threats, cyber warfare and 
NATO’s comprehensive approach for countering 21st century 
threats – mapping the new frontier of global risk and security 
management”, (2011) 88 Amicus Curiae 24). 
Between 2011 and 2012, NATO drew up a specific threat 
catalogue, which identified security-specific risks beyond 
conventional warfare threats: nuclear proliferation; terrorism; 
cyber-crime and cyber-war; organised crime and its role in 
drugs, arms and human trafficking; migration; ethnic and 
religious conflicts; population conflicts due to resource 
scarcity; and globalisation. NATO recognised that such threats 
may amount to a concrete threat to the alliance or that NATO 
could be authorised by the United Nations, because of their 
capacity, to intervene. Recognising this NATO worked on a 
related global approach (comprehensive approach) in order 
to counter these risks. This approach envisaged involving state 
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and non-state actors in a comprehensive defence strategy that 
combines political, diplomatic, economic, military technical 
and scientific initiatives. Despite intensive work on this 
approach as part of a “Countering hybrid threats” experiment 
in 2011, the NATO project work in 2012 had to stop due 
to lack of support from their members – a decision which 
turned out to have been made rather prematurely given the 
Russian aggression in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine since 2014 
(see Sascha Dov Bachmann, “Hybride Bedrohungen” in Sicher 
und Morgen? Sicherheits Politische Jahresvorschau 2016 (Security 
Political Preview for 2016) at 85-87).  
Consequently, NATO decided to reactivate its work on the 
dormant hybrid threat concept when it announced during its 
September 2014 Wales Summit:
We will ensure that NATO is able to effectively address the specific 
challenges posed by hybrid warfare threats, where a wide range 
of overt and covert military, paramilitary, and civilian measures 
are employed in a highly integrated design. It is essential 
that the Alliance possesses the necessary tools and procedures 
required to deter and respond effectively to hybrid warfare 
threats, and the capabilities to reinforce national forces. (NATO 
Wales Summit Declaration , para 13, Sept 2015, at http://
www.nato.int/cps/fr/natohq/official_texts_112964.
htm?selectedLocale=en).
On December 1, 2015 NATO Secretary General Jens 
Stoltenberg and European Union High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs Federica Mogherini announced the 
construction of a new hybrid warfare programme and a new 
NATO Hybrid Warfare Strategy. Current challenges by Russia 
and Daesh to alter the Euro-Atlantic security order and Middle 
East stability are performed using hybrid warfare means. This 
has made NATO adopt its new strategy, which still needs to be 
developed over 2016.
Russia uses security/military, political, legal, informational, 
technical and economic elements to feed its hybrid warfare 
activities. NATO during the 2014 Wales Summit adopted the 
readiness action plan (RAP) in order to respond to new threats. 
The RAP needs to be complemented with a proper hybrid 
warfare strategy and will be developed for the 2016 Warsaw 
Summit. The question is how NATO, primarily oriented to 
provide collective defence, will transform structures and 
procedures properly to respond to the challenges of hybrid 
warfare. Developing a long-term strategy gives advantage to the 
NATO allies vis-à-vis those using hybrid warfare, which is by 
definition a method applying short-term set tactics without a 
strategy aimed at causing its adherents sustainability problems 
in the long term.
Current (US) military literature acknowledges the existence 
of hybrid warfare without clarifying it as a new category or 
sub-category of existing warfare categories. Drawing from 
his assessment of the Israel - Hezbollah war of 2006, the 
US military writer Frank Hoffman, as one of the principal 
advocates of hybrid warfare, argues that: 
[h]ybrid threats incorporate a full range of different modes of 
warfare including conventional capabilities, irregular tactics and 
formations, terrorist acts including indiscriminate violence and 
coercion, and criminal disorder. Hybrid wars can be conducted 
by both states and a variety of non-state actors [with or without 
state sponsorship]. (see Frank G Hoffman, “Conflict in 
the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars” (Arlington, 
VA: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, December 
2007, 8),  available at http://www.potomacinstitute.
org/publications/Potomac_HybridWar_0108.pdf; 
also Hoffman, “Hybrid threats: Reconceptualising 
the evolving character of modern conflict”. Strategic 
Forum 240, 2009, 1; Hoffman,“Hybrid warfare and 
challenges”, Joint Forces Quarterly 52, 1Q, 2009, 1-2.) 
Consequently, hybrid warfare appears to be mainly a 
warfare variation, which looks for using an economy as a force 
of war. For achieving such an economy, state or non-state 
actors interact with their adversary by only investing in minor 
traditional military means. These actors employ methods based 
on traditional war-fighting approaches to contribute towards, 
but not being the main means of, achieving: 
a) the end of hostilities before adversary’s political goals are 
reached; 
b) consolidating stagnant situations – turning them into 
intractable or “simple incidents”;  
c) eroding and delegitimising the internal and external 
prestige, reputation, and support of a superior military 
force, state or state apparatus, and/or international 
organisations;
d) creating confusion in general by questioning the agreed 
political, religious or territorial status quo; and 
e) building new dependencies and structures on essential-
resources to support consolidated or imposed political, 
religious or territorial changes.  
Among the means or methods used in hybrid warfare to 
achieve the intentions described above, we can find “lawfare”, 
which is no less than the use of law as a means of war, ie as a 
(non-lethal) weapon. 
LAWFARE AS A COMPONENT OF HYBRID 
WARFARE
Lawfare is using law as a weapon with the goal of manipulating 
the law by changing legal paradigms. It appears to have been 
first defined by Dunlap back in 2001, who refined his previous 
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definition in 2007 to state that lawfare “is the strategy of using 
– or misusing – law as a substitute for traditional military 
means to achieve an operational objective”(C Dunlap “Lawfare 
Today: a Perspective”, Yale Journal of International Affairs (Winter 
2008), 146).
In the case of the conflict brought by Russia into Ukraine, 
lawfare plays a relevant part and has its roots in an undefined 
situation, ie the lack of definition of the conflict (whether it 
constitutes international armed conflict, non-international 
armed conflict, or civil unrest). This ambiguous situation 
creates confusion as to the source or paradigm of applicable 
law and any consequent action to identify and assign legal 
responsibilities and demand accountability. Consequently, the 
following can be argued with respect to the limits imposed by 
international law in regular conflicts. Jus ad bellum, where Russia 
denies being an active agent in the conflict, law is evaded and 
misused; (see S Reeves, R Barnsby, “The New Griffin of War. 
Hybrid International Armed Conflicts”, Harvard International 
Review, (Winter 2013) 18; S Bachmann and  H Gunneriusson, 
“Hybrid Wars: The 21st Century’s New Threats to Global 
Peace and Security”, Scientia Militaria, South African Journal of 
Military Studies, vol 43, no 1, 2015,  90-93). 
On this note, it can be said that “modern” hybrid warfare 
does not only present challenges to international peace and 
security, but also undermines current legal frameworks by 
questioning the public international law rules of the game. 
The result is a rhetorical use of international law and judicial 
processes, which may turn international humanitarian law and 
human rights law into inapplicable law, and create the idea 
that abiding by the law may also become inconsistent with the 
perceived interests of the warring parties. 
The question of the 1994 so-called Budapest Memorandum 
illustrates lawfare. It was signed by Ukraine, United States, 
Russia and United Kingdom, and the parties agreed to “respect 
the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of 
Ukraine” and “refrain from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine:” 
(United Nations Document A/49/765, S/1994/1399, 
December 19, 1994, <www.cfr.org/nonproliferation-arms-
control-and-disarmament/budapest-memorandums-security-
assurances-1994/p32484>, August 12, 2015.) However, 
after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 (and subsequent 
“occupation” of Eastern Ukraine), the Russian Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs argued in March 2015 that:
[i]n the memorandum, we also undertook to refrain from the 
threat or use of force against Ukraine’s territorial integrity or 
political independence. And this provision has been fully observed. 
Not a single shot was fired on its territory ... The loss of Ukraine’s 
territorial integrity has resulted from complicated internal processes, 
which Russia and its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum 
have nothing to do with. (Foreign Ministry Spokesman 
Alexander Lukashevich answers a media question about 
the situation around the Budapest Memorandum, 
March 12, 2015, <archive.mid.ru//brp_4.nsf/0/
CC1C845CAA26D5A043257E07004BF6EB>, August 
12, 2015).
This statement can be seen as a deliberate attempt 
at misinformation regarding the scope of existing treaty 
obligations in order to confuse public opinion in the West. 
Such malicious use of lawfare to “negate” the validity of 
treaties and void the inherent principle of international law’s 
pacta sunt servanda qualifies as treaty abuse, as a special case of 
the concept of abus de droit (see M Byers, “Abuse of Rights: an 
Old Principle, a New Age”, (2002) McGill Law Journal, vol 47, 
397-404.) This concept of “abuse of right” relates to situations 
where states or international organisations (or other subjects 
of international law) as parties to an international agreement 
interpret and apply its provisions depending on the particular 
circumstances in order to benefit from such a deviation. In 
this context, the party not applying the agreement can claim 
circumstantially that the other party exercises the agreement’s 
provisions abusively.
President Putin’s further declaration that Russia had 
intervened, under international law, “to defend the rights of 
Russian-speakers living abroad” highlights Russia’s consequent 
use of lawfare to aid its overall goals. We have highlighted 
two instances of Russia’s abuse of law and argue that any 
Russian claim to have the right to intervene in Ukraine 
under international law must prove “the urgent humanitarian 
catastrophe it seeks to avert and why there is no alternative to 
its action … [i]t should not act by stealth and revert to the ‘big 
lie’, denying that its forces are engaged, denying that its missile 
units shot down Malaysian airliner MH17, and pretending to 
be the peacemaker” (See eg E Buckley, I Pascu , “NATO’s 
Article 5 and Russian Hybrid Warfare” (March 17, 2015), 
<www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/nato-s-article-5-
and-russian-hybrid-warfare>, August 17, 2015).
This shows that the deliberate interpretation of international 
agreements in a circumstantial manner amounts to lack of 
good faith, amounting to being an abus de droit and potentially 
giving rise to state responsibility, (‘1075th Meeting’, Yearbook 
of the International Law Commission 1970, vol 1 (New York: 
United Nations, 1971) 181 at para 40; see also the Articles 
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
2001, <legal.un.org/avl/ha/rsiwa/rsiwa.html>,  and the 
Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, 
New York, December 9, 2011, <legal.un.org/avl/ha/ario/ario.
html>, August 19, 2015) in the case of Russia (or other states) 
aiding and abetting non-state actors. 
Voyger in support of the above argues that “[w]hile Russia is 
not in control of the entire international legal system, and thus 
not fully capable of changing it ‘de jure’, it is definitely trying 
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to erode its fundamental principles ‘de facto’” – see M Voyger, 
“Russia’s Use of ‘Legal’ as an Element of its Comprehensive 
Warfare Strategy”, NATO LANDCOM, Izmir Review (2015) 1 
(not yet published - onn file with the authors).
It remains to be seen to what extent Voyger’s prediction will 
come true.
CONCLUSION
The main conclusion of this paper is that the inherent 
complexity, ambiguity and the attributable character of hybrid 
warfare creates not only new security but also legal challenges 
for those opponents who adhere to international law within 
good faith and the commonly agreed frameworks established 
under and governed by the principles of the rule of law. Law-
abiding state actors are currently being confronted by hybrid 
warfare initiatives which deprive them of the opportunity to 
resolve issues through timely and appropriate political decision-
making processes. Such law-abiding actors are constrained by 
compliance with the rule of law and public morality, which 
make them operate under the aegis of democratic procedures 
and be subject to court review and public opinion scrutiny. 
A chaotic legal environment where the rules of the game 
have been blown out by those using hybrid warfare requires 
law-abiding states and others to act by using counter tactics 
containing a comprehensive legal approach and broad legal 
interoperability, which should include the use of affirmative 
lawfare in all imaginable aspects of law to support the fight 
against hybrid warfare.
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